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THE LOGIC OF RECIPROCITY: TRUST,
COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND LAW
Dan M. Kahan

I.

*

INTRODUCTION

The Logic of Collective Action1 has for decades supplied the logic
of public-policy analysis. In this pioneering application of public
choice theory, Mancur Olson elegantly punctured the premise shared by a variety of political theories - that individuals can be
expected to act consistently with the interest of the groups to which
they belong. Absent externally imposed incentives, wealth-maximizing
individuals, he argued, will rarely find it in their interest to contribute
to goods that benefit the group as a whole, but rather will "free ride"
on the contributions that other group members make. As a result, too
few individuals will contribute sufficiently, and the well-being of the
group will suffer.2 These assumptions dominate public-policy analysis
and public policy itself across a host of regulatory domains - from tax
collection to environmental conservation, from street-level policing to
policing of the internet.
But as a wealth of social science evidence now makes clear,
Olson's

Logic

is false. In collective-action settings, individuals adopt

not a materially calculating posture but rather a richer, more emotion
ally nuanced

reciprocal

one. When they perceive that others are

behaving cooperatively, individuals are moved by honor, altruism, and
like dispositions to contribute to public goods even without the in
ducement of material incentives. When, in contrast, they perceive that
others are shirking or otherwise taking advantage of them, individuals
are moved by resentment and pride to withhold their own cooperation
and even to engage in personally costly forms of retaliation.
This set of dynamics - which I propose to refer to as the "logic of
reciprocity" - suggests not only an alternative account of when
collective-action problems will arise, but also an alternative program
for solving ( or simply avoiding) them through law. Whereas the con-

* Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law, Yale Law School. B.A. 1986, Middlebury; J.D.
1989, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to Herbert Giatir and to workshop participants from
Seaton Hall Law School, the University of Southern California Law School, and Harvard
Law School for comments.

1. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
2.

See id. at 1-2.
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ventional logic of collective action counsels the creation of appropriate
external incentives, the logic of reciprocity suggests the importance of
promoting trust. Individuals who have faith in the willingness of others
to contribute their fair share will voluntarily respond in kind. And
spontaneous cooperation of this sort breeds more of the same, as indi
viduals observe others contributing to public goods and are moved to
reciprocate. In this self-sustaining atmosphere of trust, reliance on
costly incentive schemes becomes less necessary. By the same token,
individuals who lack faith in their peers can be expected to resist con
tributing to public goods, thereby inducing still others to withhold
their cooperation as a means of retaliating. In this self-sustaining
atmosphere of distrust, even strong (and costly) regulatory incentives
are likely to be ineffective in promoting desirable behavior.
Indeed, such incentives may well undermine the conditions of trust
necessary to hold collective-action problems at bay. Conspicuous
rewards and punishments can imply that others aren't inclined to
cooperate voluntarily, a message that predictably weakens individuals'
commitment to contributing to public goods. In addition, incentive
schemes tend to mask the extent to which individuals are inclined to
contribute

to

public

goods voluntarily,

thereby

weakening

the

tendency of observable cooperation to generate reciprocal coopera
tion by others. In short, manipulating material incentives may not only
be an inefficient regulatory strategy for solving collective-action
problems; it may often be a self-defeating one.
This Essay will elaborate upon and apply these claims. It begins by
distilling from the reciprocity literature a set of behavioral dynamics
pertinent to societal collective-action problems. It then shows how
these dynamics can be used to analyze and improve policymaking in
various regulatory fields, with a particular emphasis on tax compli
ance, the siting of noxious facilities, the production of ideas and tech
nology, and the policing of street crime.
II.

THE LOGIC OF RECIPROCITY

Accepted for decades on a combination of faith and anecdote, the
premises of the conventional theory of collective action have only
recently been subjected to sustained and rigorous empirical examina
tion. This research suggests an alternative theory - the logic of reci
procity - that differs from the conventional position in four impor
tant respects, each of which merits specific attention.
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Agents: Wealth Maximizers vs. Emotional/Moral Reciprocators
The first pair of contrasting elements in Figure 1 relates to the

nature of individuals' utility functions. The conventional theory
assumes that individuals in collective-action settings - ones that take
the form of a standard prisoner's dilemma - behave like wealth
maximizers. That is, they refuse to contribute to collective goods and
instead free ride on the contributions made by others, who, as wealth
maximizers,

also

contribute

nothing. The reciprocity

theory,

in

contrast, sees individuals as moral and emotional reciprocators. M ost
persons think of themselves and want to be understood by others as
cooperative and trustworthy and are thus willing to contribute their
fair share to securing collective goods. By the same token, most indi
viduals loathe being taken advantage of. Accordingly, if they perceive
that most other individuals are shirking, they too hold back to avoid
feeling (or being) exploited.
Individuals who care only about maximizing their wealth are at
best weak reciprocators. If a rational wealth maximizer anticipates that
she will be engaged in repeat transactions with another identifiable
agent over a sufficiently long period of time under circumstances
where both can observe and keep track of one another's actions, then
her best strategy is to reward cooperation with cooperation and defec
tion with defection in a "tit for tat" pattern.3 Emotional and moral
reciprocators, in contrast, are strong reciprocators: they will condition
their contributions to collective goods on the contributions of others
even in fleeting transactions with multiple actors whose behavior they
cannot keep track of and whose identities they can't even discern.
3. This conclusion is elegantly demonstrated by a variety of different means in ROBERT
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
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The prevalence of this sort of strong reciprocity is supported by a
considerable body of evidence. Much of it is experimental in nature.
So-called

"public-goods

experiments"

-

laboratory

constructs

designed to simulate collective-action problems - have consistently
shown that the willingness of individuals to make costly contributions
to collective goods is highly conditional on their perception that others
are willing to do so.4 Empirical studies of real-world behavior corrobo
rate this finding. For example, individuals have been shown to recip
rocate the disposition of others to give (or not) to charity, 5 to refrain
(or not) from littering,6 and to wait their tum (or not) in lines.7 Indeed,
individuals behave like reciprocators even in markets: econometric
and other forms of field research, for example, suggest that when firms
compensate their workers more generously workers reciprocate by
voluntarily working harder.8
B.

Collective Behavior: Unique vs. Multiple Equilibria

The second pair of contrasts concerns collective behavior. In typi
cal collective-action settings, the conventional theory treats defection
or free riding as the dominant strategy for every individual. Accord
ingly, that theory predicts a single collective behavioral equilibrium:
universal noncooperation.
Under the reciprocity theory, in contrast, there is no "dominant"
individual strategy. Individuals prefer to contribute if they believe
others are inclined to contribute, but to free ride if they believe others
are inclined to free ride.

4. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Impli
cations of Homo Reciprocans, 42 E UR. ECON. REV. 845 (1998).
5. See Peter H. Reingen, Test of a List Procedure for Inducing Compliance with a Re
quest to Donate Money, 67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 110 (1982); see also ROBERT B. CIALDINI,
INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 96-97 (3d ed. 1993) (describing techniques used to
create impressions of widespread charitable giving).
6. See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 29-30 (Richard C. Atkinson et al. eds.,
7th ed. 1995); Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the
Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 1015 (1990).
7. See Stanley Milgram et al., Response to Intrusion into Waiting Lines, 51 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 683 (1986) (summarizing experiments finding that indi
viduals standing in line will defend against intruders under a variety of conditions); Bernd H.
Schmitt et al., Intrusions into Waiting Lines: Does the Queue Constitute a Social System?, 63
J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 806 (1992) (same).
8. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q.J. ECON. 543
(1982); WILLIAM T. DICKENS & LAWRENCE F. KATZ, INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE
DIFFERENCES AND THEORIES OF WAGE DETERMINATION 25-26 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 2271, 1987); Lawrence F. Katz & Lawrence H. Summers, In
dustry Rents: Evidence and Implications, in 1989 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY,
MICROECONOMICS 209. See generally EFFICIENCY WAGE MODELS OF THE LABOR MARKET
(George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen eds., 1986).
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Such interdependencies tend to generate patterns of collective
behavior characterized by multiple equilibria punctuated by tipping
points.9 If, for whatever reason, some individuals conclude that those
around them are inclined to contribute, they'll respond by contribut
ing in kind, prompting still others to contribute, and so forth and so on
until a highly cooperative state of affairs takes root. But if some indi
viduals conclude that others are free riding, then they will respond by
free riding too, spurring others to do the same, and so forth and so on
until mass noncooperation becomes the norm.
This dynamic, too, has been empirically documented. In multi
round public-goods experiments, for example, contribution levels tend
to migrate steadily toward or away from the social optimum depend
ing on whether subjects behaved relatively cooperatively or noncoop
eratively early on.1 0 Scholars have also documented that the incidence
9.

These patterns can be illustrated graphically.
FIGURE2
Multiple Equilibria and Tipping Points
% contributing
in I,,+/

1

70

40

so

60

100
% contributing in t,,

In this particular representation, there are three equilibria. One (selected arbitrarily for
illustration) is around 50%: if participants in a collective-action setting perceive that about
half of the other participants are contributing in the period t� then about half will choose to
contribute in the period t••1• which means that about that many will contribute in the period
t••1. and so forth and so on. But this middle equilibrium is relatively unstable. If as a result of
some exogenous shock, more than 50% are induced to contribute in t. (say, 60%), then an
even higher percentage than that will be willing to contribute in t••1 (70%) , leading to a still
higher percentage in t••,, and so forth and so on until contribution levels top out at the high
cooperation equilibrium at the upper-right-hand comer. Similarly, if for some reason less
than 50% contribute in t. (say, 40%), then an even smaller percentage will contribute in t•• ,
(30%), leading to a lower contribution level in t••1, and so forth and so on until contributions
bottom out at the low-cooperation equilibrium at the lower-left-hand comer. The comer
equilibria, moreover, are relatively stable: exogenous shocks may result in temporary boosts
or drops in contributions but unless they are big enough to push the contribution level back
across the 50% tipping point, collective behavior will quickly settle back into the comer
equilibrium from which it started. See generally THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES
AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1978) (developing formal model of tipping points and feedback
effects); Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the
Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997) (same).

10. See generally Armin Falk & Urs Fischbacher, A Theory of Reciprocity (Feb.
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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of littering, recycling, smoking in public, safe sex, and other types of
behavior that affect collective welfare are likewise subject to feedback
effects and multiple equilibria - generating dramatic variations in
their incidence across space and over time.U
C.

Promoting Cooperation: Incentives vs. Trust

The third contrast between the conventional theory of collective
action and the logic of reciprocity has to do with policy prescriptions.
The conventional theory sees incentives as the solution to collective
action problems: because wealth maximizers can't be counted on to
contribute to public goods, they must be prodded to do so with either
rewards or punishments that align their individual and collective inter
ests.
The reciprocity theory suggests an alternative policy, namely, the
promotion of trust. If individuals can be made to believe that others
are inclined to contribute to public goods, then they can be induced to
contribute in turn, even without recourse to incentives.When permit
ted to communicate during play, for example, subjects in multiround
public-goods experiments tend to assure one another that they'll con
tribute rather than free ride. Although unenforceable, such assurances
do in fact prompt subjects to make larger contributions, which they
quickly increase toward the social optimum as they observe others
doing the same.12 In sum, face-to-face assurance giving builds trust,
which in turn generates reciprocal cooperation.
Indeed, field and laboratory research suggests that incentives, far
from

solving collective-action

problems,

can sometimes

actually

magnify them by dissipating trust. The simple existence of an incentive
scheme can be seen as a cue that other individuals are not inclined to
cooperate voluntarily: if they were, incentives would be unnecessary.
This inference can in turn trigger a reciprocal disposition to withhold
voluntary cooperation and thereby undercut, if not wholly displace,
the force of the incentive. In addition, the existence of incentives can
mask voluntary contributions to public goods, thereby diluting the
power of such contributions to trigger reciprocal cooperation. Relat
edly, incentives can crowd out dispositions such as altruism by extin-

1 1 . See, e.g. , Robert Cooter, Normative Failure Theory of Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV .
947, 976-77 (1997) (discussing smoking and compliance with "pooper scooper" laws); Timur
Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, A vailability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683,
687-89, 746 (1999) (discussing safe sex, smoking, and environmental concerns); Cass R. Sun
stein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2033-36 (1996) (discuss
ing smoking, unsafe sex, firearm use, and other forms of risk-creating behavior).

12. See John 0. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in T HE
HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 1 1 1 , 156-58 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth
eds., 1995); Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON.
PERSP. 137, 146 (2000).
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guishing the opportunity of individuals to demonstrate (to themselves
and to others) that they are willing to sacrifice material gain for the
public good. And if, for any of these reasons, the advent of a material
incentive induces even a few individuals to contribute less to a public
good, reciprocity dynamics will likely induce still others to contribute
less, thereby inducing others to do the same, and so forth and so on
until collective behavior settles into a new, noncooperative equilib
rium - one that is likely to be impervious to the subsequent removal
of material incentives.13
It would be a mistake, though, to conclude that material incentives
invariably diminish trust. They are most likely to have that effect,
research suggests, when individuals start out with the belief that most
other individuals are inclined to contribute to some public good volun
tarily; it's when individuals expect voluntary cooperation that the ad
vent of material incentives creates the greatest risk of adverse cueing,
masking, and crowding out. But the situation will likely be different if
individuals start out with the belief that most other individuals are
inclined to shirk or free ride. In that case, the advent of a credible
reward or penalty can work - not just by changing individuals'
material incentives but by changing in a positive way their impression
of the willingness of other individuals to behave cooperatively in a
collective-action setting.
An example is the power of higher-than-average wages to elicit
higher-than-average

productivity

in

the

workplace.14

Workers

naturally suspect their firms of being unwilling to share a fair portion
of the surplus generated by the workers' labor. But when a firm offers
workers a wage that exceeds the industry average, workers are likely
to infer that that particular firm is willing to divide the surplus fairly;
they therefore respond by voluntarily working more productively,
which inclines firms to maintain or even raise their wages. The result is
a self-sustaining form of reciprocal cooperation that obviates the need
for costly performance-monitoring regimes.

13. See BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
PERSONAL MOTIVATION (1997); RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (1971)
(finding incentives suppress donation of blood); Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation
Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589 (2001); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine
ls a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000) (finding that fine increased rather than decreased
abuse of day-care-center rules by parents); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or
Don't Pay at All (Apr. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (finding that in
centives decreased rather than increased performance of individuals soliciting charitable do
nations).
14.

See supra note 8.
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Variability of Preferences: Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous

Finally, the conventional theory and the reciprocity theory differ
on the variability of preferences across individuals. The conventional
theory imagines that the disposition to free ride in collective-action
settings is relatively uniform. In contrast, the evidence on which the
reciprocity theory rests suggests that the disposition to cooperate
varies. In public-goods experiments that generate multiple equilibria,
for example, neither universal cooperation nor universal defection is
the final resting point.
It makes more sense, then, to envision a distribution of cooperative
dispositions across the population.
FIGURE3

Heterogeneity of Collective Action
Dispositions

%of
Population

Free Riders

Reciprocators

Neutral
Reciprocators

Tolerant
Dedicated
Reciprocators Cooperators

Collective·Action
Disposition

Some relatively small fraction of the population (consisting, perhaps,
of those who've been trained in neoclassical economics) consists of
committed free riders, who shirk no matter what anyone else does,
and another small fraction (maybe those who've read too much
Kantian moral philosophy) consists of dedicated cooperators, who
contribute no matter what. But most individuals are reciprocators,
who condition their cooperation on the willingness of others to con
tribute. Moreover, some reciprocators are relatively intolerant: they
bolt as soon as they observe anyone else free riding. Others are rela
tively tolerant, continuing to contribute even in the face of what they
see as a relatively modest degree of defection. And a great many more
- call them the neutral reciprocators - fall somewhere in between.
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Under these circumstances, individuals are unlikely fully to over
come collective-action problems through reciprocity dynamics alone.
No matter how cooperative the behavior of others, the committed free
riders will always free ride if they can get away with it. Indeed, the
committed free riders' shirking could easily provoke noncooperative
behavior by the less tolerant reciprocators, whose defection in turn
risks inducing the neutral reciprocators to abandon ship, thereby
prompting even the tolerant reciprocators to throw in the towel, and
so forth and so on. If this unfortunate chain reaction takes place, a
state of affairs once characterized by a reasonably high degree of
cooperation could tip decisively toward a noncooperative equilibrium
in which only the angelic, Kantian, unconditional cooperators are left
contributing (probably futilely) to the relevant public good.
Maximum cooperation, then, probably requires that reciprocity
dynamics be supplemented with appropriately tailored incentives,
most likely in the form of penalties aimed specifically at persistent free
riders. Although trust and reciprocity elicit cooperation from most
players, some coercive mechanism remains necessary for the small
population of dedicated free riders, who continue to hold out in the
face of widespread spontaneous cooperation, thereby depressing the
contributions made by some relatively unforgiving reciprocators. In
the face of a credible penalty, however, the committed free riders fall
into line. The existence of such penalties in turn assures the less toler
ant reciprocators that their cooperation won't make them

into

chumps; they thus continue to cooperate, less out of material interest
than out of positive reciprocal motivations. And because the less
tolerant reciprocators contribute, so do the neutral and tolerant recip
rocators, generating an equilibrium of near-universal cooperation.
Again, these dynamics are borne out by empirical evidence, particu
larly public-goods experiments that allow subjects to retaliate against
defectors.15
The uneven effect of penalties in promoting and dissipating trust
calls attention to the expressive dimension of incentives. Incentives do
more than affect individuals' calculations of the costs and benefits of
particular forms of conduct; they also shape their impressions of the
attitudes and intentions of those around them.16 Laboratory and real
world schemes that use generally applicable incentives convey the
message that noncooperation is the norm, and thus stifle the reciprocal
motivations of even neutral reciprocators, whose defection predictably
spills over onto even the most forgiving ones. Targeted retaliation, in
contrast, conveys a very different message. Because all individuals are

15. See Falk & Fischbacher, supra note 10; Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Cooperation
and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2000).
16. See generally Dan
349 (1997).

VA. L. REV.

M. Kahan,
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aware from social experience that there are some committed free
riders out there, no one is surprised or disappointed to see penalties
aimed at those types; accordingly, such penalties don't create the cue
ing, masking, or crowding-out effects associated with more generalized
incentive regimes. On the contrary, penalties understood to be neces
sitated only by the existence of committed free riders have a trust
enhancing effect, for they imply that most individuals are not inclined
to shirk. Targeted retaliation works, in sum, because it simultaneously
coerces dedicated free riders, calms unforgiving reciprocators, and
avoids confusing or demoralizing neutral and forgiving reciprocators.
Ill. TAX COMPLIANCE
Tax compliance is the consummate collective-action problem from
a public-policy point of view. Society collects taxes to finance a variety
of goods - from education to highways to national defense - that
benefit its members collectively. Nevertheless, it is in the individual
material interest of every citizen to free ride on her fellow citizens'
contributions to these goods by withholding any contribution of her
own. Accordingly, the conventional theory predicts that individuals, as
wealth maximizers, will evade their taxes unless furnished with incen
tives - in the form of threatened penalties - that make the expected
return from evasion smaller than the expected return from compli
ance.17
This account of tax evasion is embarrassingly ill supported by
empirical evidence. Econometric studies have concluded that the
expected penalty for evasion explains little if any of the variation in
compliance across space or over time.18 Survey measures also find only
very modest correlation between reported compliance and individuals'
subjective perception of the expected penalty for evasion.19 Finally,
laboratory experiments that simulate the decision to evade suggest
that probability and severity of detection can influence individual
decisions to evade, but only when they are set at levels far in excess of

those associated with actual policies.2 0

17. See generally Michael G. Allingham &
Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972).

Agnar Sandmo,

Income Tax Evasion: A

18. See James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 842 (1998);
FRANK A. COWELL, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION 74
(1990); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Criminal Deterrence Literature: Implications for
Research on Taxpayer Compliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 126, 142 (Jeffrey A. Roth
& John T. Scholz eds., 1989).
19. See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of
Social Control: A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 213, 225 &
226 tbl.4 (1982).
20.
(1998).

See

James Andreoni et al.,

Tax Compliance,

36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 841
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What explains a lot more, empirical research suggests, is a complex
of factual beliefs and emotional dispositions. Thus, an individual's per
ception of the extent of evasion powerfully predicts compliance
behavior: the higher an individual believes the rate of tax cheating to
be, the more likely he or she is to cheat too.21 So too are the prospects
of shame (or potential stigma) and guilt. The more strongly she antici
pates being condemned by others should she be caught, the more
likely an individual is to refrain from evading. By the same token, the
more regret or remorse an individual believes she'd experience for en
gaging in evasion, the less likely she is to do so.22
These are exactly the factors one would expect to influence tax
compliance were individuals behaving like moral and emotional recip
rocators. An emotional and moral reciprocator wants to understand
herself and be understood by others as fair, but she loathes being
taken advantage of. With tax collection as with other collective-action
settings, the extent to which others appear to be contributing to the
good in question determines which of these sensibilities comes into
play. If most other individuals seem to be paying their taxes, then eva
sion will provoke either guilt, shame, or both in the reciprocator who
covets the respect of others and of herself. If, in contrast, most indi
viduals appear to be evading, then complying won't make her feel
guilty or ashamed at all; it will make her feel like a sucker.
This interpretation of the data is confirmed by an experiment that
tested how the 1986 Tax Reform Act affected compliance levels.2 3 One
hypothesis, suggested by the conventional theory, was that individuals
would become more or less willing to evade depending on whether the
Tax Reform Act had increased or decreased their relative tax burden.
The study found no such correlation. What

did

shift patterns of com

pliance, the researchers found, were the types of interactions that
individuals had with other taxpayers in the months leading up to the
reform: those who encountered others who expressed a positive atti
tude toward, and commitment to complying with, the Tax Reform Act
displayed greater commitment to complying

with it themselves,

whereas those who encountered others who expressed negative atti-

21. See Robert B. Cialdini, Social Motivations to Comply: Norms, Values, and Principles,
in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE, supra note 18, at 200, 215; James P.F. Gordon, Individual
Morality and Reputation Costs as Deterrents to Tax Evasion, 33 EUR. ECON. REV. 797
(1989); Klepper & Nagin, supra note 18, at 144; Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can
Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY
PEOPLE PAY TAXES 193 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).
22. See, e.g., Grasmick & Scott, supra note 19, at 226 tbl.4; Wilbur J. Scott & Harold G.
Grasmick, Deterrence and Income Tax Cheating: Testing Interaction Hypotheses in Utilitarian
Theories, 17 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 395, 403 tbl.1 (1981).
23. Marco R. Steenbergen et al., Taxpayer Adaptation to the 1986 Tax Reform Act: D o
New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes?, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES,
supra note 21, at 9.
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effect,

moreover,

was

explained completely by variation in the shame and guilt that the two
groups of taxpayers anticipated for failing to pay their taxes.2 5 In other
words, as moral and emotional reciprocators, these individuals natu
rally felt guilt and shame for failing to contribute to the public good of
tax payment in proportion to their perception that others were or were
not contributing.
The conventional theory of collective action is just as weak at
explaining variance in tax compliance across nations as it is in
explaining variance in compliance across individuals. Tax compliance
rates vary

dramatically across nations.

Essentially

none of

this

variance, however, can be explained by differences in the expected
penalty for evasion. More important, researchers have concluded, are
differences in public attitudes toward tax laws. In some nations
(including the United States), individuals tend to view paying their
taxes as an important civic obligation, and are highly motivated to pay
for that reason. In other nations (including many in Western Europe),
individuals regard tax obligations much more casually (akin, say, to
traffic regulations in the United States), and display no particular
moral aversion to evading them if they feel they can safely do so.26
Varying national "tax cultures" of this sort are perfectly under
standable under the reciprocity theory. Because individuals are recip
rocators, their decisions in a collective-action setting feed on and re
inforce each other, generating multiple high- and low-cooperation
equilibria independent of the material payoffs associated with cooper
ating or defecting. If individuals believe those around them are
inclined to pay their taxes, they will (as a result of guilt, shame, pride,
and the like) be more likely to comply, thereby strengthening the
collective perception that individuals are generally inclined to pay. If,
in contrast, individuals believe that those around them are inclined to
evade, resentment will inhibit them from complying, strengthening the
collective perception that most individuals are inclined to cheat. In
other words, what we should expect to see under the reciprocity
theory is exactly what we do see - namely, competing and relatively
durable norms toward tax compliance.27
The empirical evidence also bears out the trust theory's anxiety
about the self-defeating effect of material incentives. Experimental

24.

See id.

25.

See id.

at 29-30.

26. See COWELL, supra note 18, at 102-03; James Alm
conomic Factors in Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3 (1995).

et al.,

Economic and None

27. See Sheffrin & Triest, supra note 21, at 194-95 (suggesting interdependence of tax
payer decisionmaking should generate multiple behavioral equilibria); see also COWELL,
supra note 18, at 112-13 (developing a theoretical model that predicts multiple compliance
equilibria based on interdependence of taxpayers' decisions to evade).
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evidence suggests that when taxpayers are exposed to information
highlighting the penalties for evasion, they respond in much the same
way that subjects in public-goods experiments do when furnished with
generalized material incentives to contribute - namely, by contribut
ing less.28 Researchers have also found that highly politicized auditing
campaigns tend to provoke a higher incidence of tax cheating rather
than a lower one. 29
The mechanism for these effects appears to be social cueing. When
government engages in dramatic gestures to make individuals aware
that the penalties for tax evasion are being increased, it also causes
individuals to infer that more taxpayers than they thought are choos
ing to cheat. This distrust of one's neighbors triggers a reciprocal
motive to evade, which dominates the greater material incentive to
comply associated with the higher-than-expected penalty.3 0
Is there a way for tax enforcers to bolster taxpayers' trust in one
another? One policy that seems to do so is simply to advise citizens
that the vast majority of taxpayers are in fact complying. In a study
sponsored by the Minnesota Department of Revenue, researchers sent
letters to a group of individuals stating that tax compliance rates were
in fact much higher than what public opinion polls suggested citizens
believed them to be. Those individuals thereafter reported more
income and claimed fewer deductions than did individuals in a control
group. This is exactly what the phenomenon of reciprocity would
predict: when they learn that others are in fact disposed to contribute
their fair share, individual taxpayers, just like individuals in public
goods experiments, cooperatively respond in kind. Likewise consistent
with the reciprocity theory - and at odds with the conventional
economic one - the Minnesota study found that individuals advised
of high compliance rates paid more tax than did individuals who re
ceived letters advising them that their returns would be subject to a
greater rate of auditing!31
Another policy that appears to promote trust and hence bolster
reciprocal cooperation is the enactment of widely supported reforms.
As the study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act demonstrates, such reforms
promote the expression of positive views toward the law. When they
hear others defending the law, individuals infer that others are
inclined to comply. That conclusion in turn triggers the disposition to
reciprocate. In effect, the enactment of popular reforms generates an
environment of face-to-face assurance giving that builds trust, and a
28. See Richard
274, 298 (1967).

D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans,

29. See Sheffrin & Tries!, supra note 21,

at

On Legal Sanctions, 34

U. CHI. L. REV.

209-14.

30. See id.
31. See STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE
EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS (1996).

MINNESOTA

INCOME

TAX
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resulting disposition to cooperate, in much the same way that discus
sion does in public-goods experiments.
The contribution that reciprocity makes to tax compliance doesn't
imply that the IRS should disavow punishments for evasion
altogether. That would be foolhardy because of the variability of indi
vidual dispositions to cooperate in collective-action settings. With no
risk of punishment, evasion would become commonplace among dedi
cated cheaters, whose defections could in turn unleash a contagious
form of demoralization among the vast run of reciprocity-minded tax
payers.
The difference between effective incentives and ineffective ones,
experimental and other empirical data suggest, lies in the social
meanings they express. Enforcers should therefore carefully select
cases to nourish the perception that evaders are deviants, not normal
citizens.32 It is already common belief that a certain number of excep
tionally venal individuals will evade even when nearly all the rest of us
are complying. The existence of coercive incentives understood to be
aimed at those persons, then, doesn't dispel trust; on the contrary, it
helps to assure the honest multitudes that they are not being exploited
when they choose to pay their taxes. A model case, in this sense, was
the tax-fraud prosecution of hotel magnate Leona Helmsley, who
expressed open contempt for income taxes as something that "only the
little people pay."33
In addition, officials should always juxtapose trust-enhancing
information with penalties. Auditing crackdowns and other high
profile modes of enforcement risk backfiring, the evidence suggests,
because they function as a cue that evasion is widespread. To counter
act this inference, enforcers should be sure that the good news that the
vast majority of citizens voluntarily comply always gets at least equal
billing with the bad news that a small minority don't. They should take
advantage of the attention that high-profile prosecutions naturally
attract to publicize positive information akin to that shown to generate
even higher rates of compliance in the Minnesota Tax Experiment.
Unfortunately, public officials often do just the opposite. Com
peting with other agencies and programs for appropriations, the IRS
routinely exaggerates the inadequacy of its own enforcement powers
and the resulting extent of evasion.34 Usually timed to be reported on
the media the week before personal income taxes are due, IRS
generated stories of the agency's own inefficacy in enforcing the law

32.

See Cialdini, supra note 21, at 215.

See The Wicked Witch Who Has Poisoned the Big Apple, TIMES (London), Sept. 3,
1989 (" 'She deserves everything she gets, she's scum,' said one of hundreds of people who
waited outside the federal courthouse in Manhattan on Wednesday to jeer at Leona.").
33.

34. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2001, at Al.

A Smaller l.R.S. Gives up on Billions in Back Taxes,
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predictably generate resentment in those who routinely obey.35 "Are
You a Chump?" a Forbes magazine cover story asked its tax-paying
readers as the magazine reported on the supposed decimation of the
IRS's enforcement capacity.36
The United States enjoys a relatively high compliance rate. But
like other high-cooperation equilibria sustained by reciprocity dy
namics, the disposition of Americans voluntarily to pay their taxes
surely could be "tipped." If by rattling its saber one day and pleading
poverty the next, the IRS succeeds in inducing enough taxpayers to
believe

that

cheating

is indeed widespread,

setting

off

a

self

reinforcing wave of evasion. The result could be a new, low
cooperation equilibrium that, as the durability of Europe's disobedient
tax culture attests,37 can be very difficult to reverse. Ironically, by em
bracing the conventional-theory strategy of "incentives, incentives,
and more incentives," the IRS risks making tax compliance into ex
actly the type of intractable collective-action problem that the conven
tional theory envisions it to be.
IV. "NOTINMYBACKYARD"
Various types of public facilities - including highways, airports,
prisons, hazardous waste dumps, and the like - impose dispropor
tionate burdens (noise, perceived physical danger, health risks) on
persons who reside near them. Accordingly, even when they recognize
the benefits of these facilities for society at large, individuals often
resist the siting of these facilities within their own communities, a
phenomenon that political scientists refer to as the "not in my back
yard" phenomenon or "NIMBY."38
The conventional theory of collective action sees NIMBY as
another expression of individuals' propensity to withhold costly con
tributions to public goods and instead to free ride on the contributions
of others. Accordingly, the standard model proposes an incentives
based solution: that the communities best situated to host a particular
facility be compensated for the burden associated with it, presumably

35. See, e.g., Tom Brazaitis, Wimpy IRS Emboldens Cheats, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland,
Ohio), Apr. 18, 2001, at llB; Amy Feldman & Joan Caplin, Should You Cheat on Your
Taxes?, MONEY, Apr. 2001, at 108.
36. Janet Novack,
37.

See sources

Are You a Chump?, FORBES,

Mar. 5, 2001, at 122.

cited supra note 26 and accompanying text.

38. See generally BARRY G. RABE, BEYOND NIMBY: HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING IN
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1994); Don Munton, Introduction: The NIMBY
Problem and Approaches to Facility Siting, in HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING AND
DEMOCRATIC CHOICE 1 (Don Munton ed., 1996).
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out of the proceeds of a tax imposed on individuals who benefit from
the facility but who reside elsewhere.39
This incentives-based strategy, however, has an unimpressive track
record. Twenty years after M assachusetts enacted a widely lauded
compensation scheme, not a single community had accepted - or
been forced to accept - a facility siting. 40 The results have been the
same in numerous other states and Canadian provinces that have tried
to induce siting with compensation. 41
Indeed, there is evidence that compensation schemes sometimes
make the NIMBY problem worse. According to some studies, resi
dents often bridle at "compensation offers . . . as attempts to buy them
off or bribe them. " 42 The potential of incentives to backfire in this way
has been confirmed experimentally by Swiss economists Bruno Frey
and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, who showed that a compensation offer
dramatically reduced (from just over 50% to less than 25%) the num
ber of laboratory subjects willing to assent to the siting of a nuclear
waste storage facility in their community. 43
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that compensation
schemes never work. At least some opinion studies have shown that
offers of compensation can significantly increase willingness to accept
the siting of a noxious facility.44 Moreover, compensation in one form

39. The classic statement of this analysis is Michael O'Hare, "Not on My Block You
Don't": Facility Siting and the Strategic Importance of Compensation, 25 PUB. POL'Y 407
(1977).
40. See KENT E. PORTNEY, SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT FACILITIES 28
(1991); RABE, supra note 38, at 36-37; Rutherford H. Platt & Peter B. Klejna, Recent Devel
opments in Massachusetts Groundwater Law, Water Resources Update (Univs. Council on
Water Res., Carbondale, Ill.), Spring 1991, at 22, 23, available at http:/1131.230.120.111/
udates/pdf/V85_A5.pdf.
41.

See RABE, supra note 38, at 39-44.

42. Munton, supra note 38, at 17.
43. See FREY, supra note 13, at 69-75. In the experiment, investigators measured the
willingness of subjects to accept the siting of a nuclear-waste storage facility in their commu
nity, first without compensation and then with it. They found that individual willingness to
accept the site was initially relatively high overall (just over 50%). When subjects were told
that the community in which the site was to be located would receive monetary compensa
tion, however, overall willingness to accept the site dropped dramatically (to less than 25%).
By measuring the respondents' perceptions of the dangers of nuclear-waste storage before
and after the experiment, moreover, Frey and Oberholzer-Gee were able to exclude the ex
planation that the compensation offer had induced respondents to revise upward their as
sessment of the risk associated with the facility. Rather, the compensation offer had created
resistance, the experimenters concluded, by changing the moral significance of accepting the
siting. See id. at 69-75.
44. See Howard Kunreuther & Doug Easterling, The Role of Compensation in Siting
Hazardous Facilities, 15 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 601, 605-06 (1996); Howard
Kunreuther et al., Public Attitudes Toward Siting a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository in
Nevada, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 469, 480 (1990).
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or another has nearly always been a part of successful waste-facility
siting efforts in the United States and Canada in recent decades.45
Although failures predominate, it's fair to conclude that "studies
show a high degree of variability in the ability of compensation to
change public opinion" toward siting.46 But precisely because they are
not uniformly positive, these results furnish little support for the con
ventional theory's account of NIMBY. Clearly, something more than
the weighing of material costs and benefits is going on when communi
ties decide whether to resist or to accept noxious facilities.
That something more, opinion analyses suggest, is the moral and
emotional reaction of residents to siting proposals. Individuals who
interpret the decision to impose a site on their community as signifying
the low social status of its residents - who believe they are being
"dumped on," symbolically as well as literally - are more likely to
resist.47 Those who distrust government institutions are also less likely
to tolerate the siting of a noxious facility in their vicinity,48 as are those
who believe that societal benefits and burdens in general, and the
burdens associated with the facility in question in particular, are being
distributed inequitably.49 The perception that the community's racial
composition is playing a role in that process can create intense opposi
tion in minority communities, which historically have been least able
to muster the political resources necessary to resist forced sitings.5 0
These are the sorts of factors one would expect to influence the
reactions of individuals who behave like moral and emotional recipro
cators with respect to civic obligations. When called upon to accept
risks or inconveniences in the interest of the public good, individuals
who believe that societal benefits and burdens are being inequitably
distributed by fundamentally unjust political institutions unsurpris
ingly answer, "No."
Reciprocal motivations also explain another factor relevant to
acceptance of toxic waste facilities: the origin of the wastes. A wealth
maximization model suggests that waste source should be irrelevant:
home-grown wastes are every bit as hazardous as out-of-town ones.
45. See Munton, supra note 38, at 16; Douglas J. Lober, Beyond NIMBY: Public Atti
tudes and Behavior and Waste Facility Siting Policy 124-25 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dis
sertation, Yale Univ., School of Forestry & Env't Stud.) (on file with author).
46. Kunreuther & Easterling, supra note 44, at 605.
47. Lober, supra note 45, at 120; see also Kunreuther et al., supra note 44, at 470; Paul
Slovic et al., Perceived Risk, Stigma, and Potential Economic Impacts of High-Level Nuclear
Waste Repository in Nevada, in RISK, MEDIA, AND STIGMA 87 (James Flynn et al. eds.,
2001).
48. See Robin Gregory et al., Incentive Policies to Site Hazardous Waste Facilities, 11
RISK ANALYSIS 667, 672 (1991); Kunreuther et al., supra note 44, at 472; Lober, supra note
45, at 140-42.
49.

See

50.

See RABE, supra note 38, at 21; Lober, supra note 45, at 145.

Kunreuther & Easterling, supra note 44, at 601-02; Lober, supra note 45, at 145.
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But in fact, individuals are much more likely to accept disposal facili
ties for wastes produced locally.51 This makes sense insofar as indi
viduals are likely to accept a waste-disposal facility in a spirit of
positive reciprocation when they understand the waste to have been
generated by beneficial local activities.
The uneven effect of compensation schemes also conforms to the
logic of reciprocity, which implies that the effect of incentives in dissi
pating or promoting trust depends critically on citizens' moral and
emotional priors. Imagine a society whose citizens begin with the
belief that societal burdens are being equitably distributed through a
just political process. We might expect those individuals, as reciproca
tors, to be relatively accepting of the siting of noxious facilities in their
community. But if authorities try to purchase acceptance with incen
tives, these same individuals might revise their views, inferring that
other communities must in fact be unwilling to accept such impositions
voluntarily. As a result of this perverse cueing effect, the NIMBY
phenomenon will grow in strength when incentives are offered, as
individuals reciprocate the perceived resistance to such facilities by
strengthening their own resistance to them.
This reaction plausibly explains the results in the Frey/Oberholzer
Gee experiment.52 Homogeneous, democratic, and small, Switzerland
has an admirable history of resolving disputes over the allocation of
societal benefits and burdens through a fair process of deliberative
give-and-take. The Swiss subjects in the experiment therefore inter
preted the offer of a cash payment as evidence that the norm of
mutual accommodation had broken down in the case of nuclear wastes
and became predictably indignant at attempts to buy their assent to a
risk that others refused to endure.
But now imagine the perhaps more typical U.S. or Canadian case
of a community whose residents start off with the belief that society's
resources are being inequitably distributed as a result of a fundamen
tally unjust political system. As reciprocators, they are likely to resist
the nearby siting of a noxious facility. Yet in that climate, there is at
least some potential for compensation to work: not only does compen
sation help to offset the material inconveniences or risks associated
with the facility; the very offering of it conveys a degree of respect that
previously had been lacking in the community's political life.
Case studies suggest that this result is most likely when incentives
are part of a negotiated, bottom-up siting regime rather than a
centrally administered top-down one.53 Even with compensation, the

51.

See RABE, supra note 38, at 44; Lober, supra

52.

See supra note 43.

note 45, at 126.

53. See RABE, supra note 38, at 59; Kunreuther & Easterling, supra note 44, at 618;
Munion, supra note 38, at 19-20.
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imposition of a site by a centralized bureaucracy is likely to provoke
negative reciprocal motivations. The authority of administrators to
dictate the site location suggests that others are unwilling to accept the
facility voluntarily, a signal that is reinforced by the offer of compen
sation. When voluntary acceptance is solicited, however, communities
that historically have been disadvantaged are likely to feel respected
and empowered; the offer of compensation no longer insults them but
instead reinforces the signal that authorities genuinely respect the sov
ereignty of the host community. In addition, the process of negotiation
is likely to create a climate akin to the face-to-face discussions in
public-goods games: when local communities are able to discuss the
situation with remote political authorities, and are granted veto power,
local communities are likely to be assured that others are willing to
contribute their fair share to dealing with the problem. Accordingly,
they reciprocate positively by being more receptive to placement of
the facility.
These effects, case studies suggest, feed on each other, generating
multiple behavioral equilibria. Again, in Massachusetts, which enacted
a top-down, dictate-plus-compensation regime in the 1980s, one com
munity after another fought off attempts to site hazardous waste facili
ties within its borders. In contrast, in Wisconsin, which has a bottom
up, negotiated-compensation scheme, a succession of communities
have come forward to accept such facilities.5 4 Provinces in western
Canada have had similar strings of successes with the negotiated
compensation strategy.55
The key to solving NIMBY, in short, is trust. Various sources of
evidence suggest that individuals can be made receptive to the siting of
noxious facilities in their communities if they can be made to believe
that society is committed to treating their interests with respect.
Appropriately

structured

bottom-up,

negotiated-compensation

schemes - ones framed to emphasize respect for the interests and
autonomy of prospective host communities - are one way to reverse
deep-seated

resentments

and

thus

excite a

reciprocal

openness

to siting decisions. If individuals cannot be made to believe that the
burden of accepting a noxious facility is being fairly reciprocated
either in kind or by like sacrifices, the current of resentment that fuels
NIMBY will be difficult to reverse, even with financial incentives.

54.

See Kunreuther & Easterling, supra note 44, at 618; Lober, supra note 45, at 222-23.

See RABE, supra note 38, at 61-81; Geoffrey Castle & Don Munton, Voluntary Siting
of Hazardous Waste Facilities in Western Canada, in HAZARDOUS WASTE SITING AND
DEMOCRATIC CHOICE, supra note 38, at 57.
55.
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IDEAS AND TECHNO LO GY

Ideas are a classic collective good. We all benefit from useful
inventions,

engaging works of literature, effective medicines for

disease, and the like. But why should any one of us endure the cost
associated with producing them when we can freely avail ourselves of
the inventive labors of others? The conventional theory again resorts
to incentives, in the form of intellectual-property rights, that are
deemed to motivate invention by permitting inventors to condition use
of their ideas on payment of a fee.56
But the logic of reciprocity suggests an alternative solution. If indi
viduals behave in this collective-action setting as they do in others that is, as moral and emotional reciprocators - then they will contrib
ute to the common pool of ideas not only when they expect material
reward, but also when they observe other individuals contributing to it
and when they anticipate that sharing the fruits of their own creativity
will induce others to do the same.
The possibility of a reciprocal alternative to proprietary production
is not merely a matter of theoretical conjecture. The prime example of
such a regime is the university. Academics freely exchange ideas by
teaching, attending conferences, and most importantly by publishing
books and articles. This exchange, moreover, is deeply reciprocal. Self
consciously building on the published works of their predecessors, and
publishing works that will be extended by their successors, physicists
delineate the laws of nature, mathematicians solve intricate formal
problems, philosophers construct theories of justice, and so forth and
so on.57
Reciprocal exchange is in fact integral to the structure of scholarly
production. In Thomas Kuhn's well-known account,58 activity within
scholarly disciplines59 is cyclical: fairly stable periods of "normal
science,'' in which scholars conform their work to a widely shared set
of assumptions or "dominant paradigm," are punctuated by "scientific
revolutions," in which the dominant paradigm is overthrown and
56. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the A llocation of Resources
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).
57. See generally WARREN 0. HAGSTROM, THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY (1965);
ROBERT K. MERTON, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE
(1973).
58.
1970).

See

THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.

59. Although Kuhn developed his account as an explanation of how knowledge devel
ops in the natural sciences, his model has since been applied to other disciplines, including
the social sciences and the humanities. See generally BARRY BARNES, T.S. KUHN AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1982); STANLEY FISH, Rhetoric, in D OING WHAT COMES NATURALLY
471, 486 (1989); Steven M. Wise, Hardly a Revolution: The Eligibility of Nonhuman Animals
for Dignity-Rights in a Liberal Democracy, 22 VT. L. REV. 793, 826 n.171 (1998).
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replaced by a new one - which underwrites the next period of normal
science. As scholars contribute incrementally to a body of work gener
ated by like contributions from others, reciprocal exchange is the rule
during periods of normal science. But it is no less significant a force
during periods of scientific revolution. Because new paradigms are
inevitably forged in opposition to old ones, scientific revolutionaries
are ironically indebted to the work amassed by normal-science appa
ratchiks; and as they launch their assault, the revolutionaries predicta
bly benefit defenders of disciplinary orthodoxy, who are enlivened by
the sudden opportunity to say something new and pertinent in defense
of their work.60
The reciprocal nature of scholarly production helps to reconcile
competing stereotypes of the academic enterprise. One view sees it as
highly collaborative. Sociologists of science, for example, assert that
the production of knowledge in the university is guided by a norm of
"communism" or sharing of ideas.6 1 Another view, though, sees the
academic enterprise as highly competitive: scholars strive to demon
strate that their ideas are better than everyone else's.6 2 The truth is
that scholarly production is simultaneously collaborative and competi
tive. Scholars do compete, fiercely, for the recognition and status that
is accorded to those who make academic discoveries that either extend
understanding within the dominant paradigm or overthrow that para
digm altogether.63 In the regime of intellectual production characteris
tic of the university, competition and collaboration are yoked in a
harness of reciprocal exchange.
The nexus between status and reciprocal exchange helps to explain
how nonfinancial rewards operate to generate intellectual production
within the university. Obviously, many individuals are drawn to the
university because they get immense personal satisfaction simply from
participating in shared intellectual endeavors. But many of those types
also covet the special extrinsic rewards conferred upon those who
excel in academic fields - namely, recognition and status, both within
the university and within a larger society that esteems intellectual
accomplishment. The desire for these goods impels individuals to
behave like reciprocal producers insofar as the ideas most likely to
gain widespread admiration are ones that draw on and enable the
work of other scholars.64

60. See KUHN, supra note 58.
61. See, e.g., MERTON, supra note 57, at 273 -75.
62. See ROBERT K. MERTON, Priorities
SCIENCE, supra note 57, at 286 -324.
63. See id.
6 4. See

in Scientific Discovery, in

THE SOCIOLOGY OF

at 293-94.

ALFONSO GAMBARDELLA,
SCIENCE
AND INNOVATION:
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PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY DURING THE 1980 s 8-9 (1995); Partha Dasgupta & Paul A.
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Indeed, the desire for recognition and status makes monetary
reward secondary, if not completely irrelevant, in the development of
ideas. It's true that university professors get paid to produce. But
what's significant is how little they get paid relative to what they could
have made outside the university. Natural scientists, economists, and
- of course - law professors forgo commercial employment oppor
tunities in which they could make salaries many times larger than the
ones they earn from teaching and publishing. Even scholars whose
specialties don't involve highly marketable skills (say, professors of
eighteenth-century English literature) typically could have chosen
educational paths known to lead to more remunerative destinations
(e.g., Madison A venue advertising firms). The difference between
what these scholars make and what they could make, or could have
made, in private-sector positions reflects at least in part how much
they value the unique, nonmaterial rewards associated with partici
pating in a system of reciprocal intellectual production.
Sociologists of science sometimes sharply distinguish between the
scientific or university mode of intellectual production and a commer
cial or proprietary one. The former is driven by the intrinsic and repu
tational rewards associated with collaborative intellectual production,
which presuppose norms of publicity and sharing. The latter is said to
be driven by profit, and thus to depend on norms of secrecy that
enable producers to extract fees for access to their ideas.65
The contrast, however, turns out to be overstated. The commercial
mode of production often incorporates the university mode. In the
telecommunications, pharmaceutical, and computer industries, firms
frequently organize their research-and-development teams on

a

university model, encouraging employees not only to share their work
with one another but also to attend academic conferences, publish
scholarly papers, and otherwise exchange ideas with outsider academic
and commercial researchers.66 The most famous example is AT&T's
Bell Labs, which for decades offered positions that were as highly
coveted as professorships at elite universities and which published a
respected peer-reviewed research journal.67
Economists have regarded the emulation of the university model
by private firms as a puzzle, particularly insofar as the disclosure of
AND THE ASCENT OF MODERN ECONOMIC THEORY 519, 528-31, 534 (G.R. Feiwel ed., 1987)
(hereinafter Dasgupta & David, Information Disclosure and the Economics of Science and

Technology].
65.

See HAGSTROM, supra note 57; MERTON, supra note 57.

66. See GAMBARDELLA, supra note 64, at 17, 82-83, 86, 103; Partha Dasgupta & Paul A.
David, Toward a New Economics of Science, 23 RES. POL'Y 487, 495 (1994) [hereinafter
Dasgupta & David, Toward a New Economics of Science].
67. See generally JEREMY BERNSTEIN, THREE DEGREES ABOVE ZERO: BELL LABS IN
THE INFORMATION AGE (1984); NARAIN GEHANI, BELL LABS: LIFE IN THE CROWN JEWEL
(2003).
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ideas is thought to vitiate the competitive advantage afforded by firms'
research investments.68
The phenomenon of reciprocal creativity suggests a possible
explanation. Suppose researchers who desire to participate in collabo
rative invention and to gain recognition for intellectual accomplish
ment are on average more creative and productive than those moti
vated only by financial inducements. If so, the former will be
particularly in demand within industry. But to attract these individu
als, firms will necessarily have to offer them an opportunity to satisfy
their distinctive preference to participate in the open, reciprocal mode
of production characteristic of the university, particularly if the firms
are competing with universities to hire them.69 Firms can be expected
to offer this nonmonetary species of compensation so long as the
losses they endure as a result of permitting bright researchers to
disseminate their ideas are offset by the gains the firm reaps from
having such persons on their research teams.
This account turns out to be well supported in fact. Firms in infor
mation-intensive industries in fact say that they tolerate (and indeed
encourage) their researchers openly disseminating their ideas, par
ticularly to university scholars, in order to attract the most talented
researchers.7 0 And empirical evidence confirms a direct correlation be
tween the productivity of firms in the pharmaceutical industries
and the frequency with which their researchers publish in academic
journals.71
The final and most significant example of the reciprocal mode
of intellectual production is the advent of "open-source" software
projects. Where a programmer employs an open-source license, she
authorizes anyone to use her software product free of charge so long
as the user agrees not to disguise the identity of the programmers who
have contributed to the product's development, and to distribute for
free any additions or modifications the user makes to the program
herself.7 2 The conventional theory of collective action predicts that

68. Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 V AND. L. REV.
2175 (2000) (describing phenomenon and suggesting signaling solution); Gideon Parcho
movsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L. REV. 926 (2000) (suggesting patent-preemption
motivation).
69. See GAMBARDELLA, supra note 64, at 46-47; JOSH LERNER & JEAN TIROLE, THE
SIMPLE ECONOMICS OF OPEN SOURCE 24 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 7600, 2000) , available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7600.
70.

See, e.g., GEHANI, supra note 67, at 16-20, 45, 58-59, 70-72.

71. See GAMBARDELLA, supra note 64, at 82-83, 86; Rebecca Henderson & Iain Cock
burn, Measuring Competence? Exploring Firm Effects in Pharmaceutical Research, 15
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 63 (1994). These studies, of course, control for other influences on
productivity, including firm size.
72. See generally GLYN MOODY, REBEL CODE: LINUX AND THE OPEN SOURCE
REVOLUTION (2001). The Open Source Initiative, a nonprofit corporation that coordinates
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open-source products will be few in number and low in quality, since
neither the individual who creates such a program nor anyone who
thereafter improves it can recover any commercial benefit for her
efforts. But in fact, the open-source license has spawned an immense
collection of extremely popular and dynamic products. Linux, the
premier

open-source

operating

system,

for

example,

is

widely

regarded as superior to commercially produced operating systems.
Apache is the most popular web server, enjoying a dominant share in
a market in which it competes with the products of numerous com
mercial firms including M icrosoft.73
Open-source programming is fueled by the same individual moti
vations that generate reciprocal intellectual production within both
the university and commercial firms that emulate the university
model. Like other collaborative producers, open-source programmers
- typically students and commercial programmers working in their
spare time - enjoy participating in the collaborative process for its
own sake. In addition, many of the most productive open-source
programmers covet the status accorded to those who are recognized as
having made the most valuable modifications to popular open-source
products.7 4 Producing and distributing valued program enhancements
(the authorship of which cannot be obscured under the typical open
source license) is thus a condition of enjoying these ends. In addition,
even program users who do not attach particular value to participating
and gaining status within this form of collaborative intellectual
production are often motivated by the reciprocal motive of gratitude
to share with other contributors any enhancements they make to an
open-source product.75
More significant than what open-source programming confirms
about the motivation of individuals to participate in schemes of recip
rocal intellectual production is what it implies about the increasing
economic feasibility of such activity. Historically, individuals who
might otherwise have freely lent their efforts to reciprocal modes of
production would have had to pay a dauntingly high price - not just
in terms of the costs associated with production itself, but also in terms

open-source standards and collects information on open-source products and developments,
defines the terms of such licenses at http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.php.
73. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FuTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
CONNECTED WORLD 54-57 (2001); MOODY, supra note 72.
74. The immense fame enjoyed by Linus Torvalds, who designed the "kernel" of the
Linux operating system, the name of which reflects his own, is a conspicuous case in point.
Jim Kerstetter, The Linux Uprising, Bus. WK., Mar. 3, 2002, at 78.
75. See Peter Kollock, The Economies ofOnline Cooperation: Gifts and Public Goods in
Cyberspace, in COMMUNITIES IN CYBERSPACE 220, 227-29 (Marc A. Smith & Peter Kollock
eds., 1999); KARIM LAKHANI & ERIC VON HIPPEL, How OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE
WORKS: "FREE" USER-TO-USER ASSISTANCE 31 (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper
No. 4117, May 2000).
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of the costs associated with simply locating other producers willing to
reciprocate their efforts and distributing information to them. But
with the ubiquity of the personal computer and the comprehensive
networking furnished by the internet, these constraints are disappear
ing, making it possible for increasingly large numbers of individuals
to participate in collaborative production.76 In addition, the more
individuals who find it possible to participate, the more who find it
valuable to participate: the benefits from participating and gaining
status in collaborative production are a function of the number of
individuals with whom a creator can collaborate, and from whom she
can earn esteem.77 Like other forms of behavior governed by the logic
of reciprocity, spontaneous intellectual production feeds on itself.78
The reality of the reciprocal production of ideas has important
policy implications. Because intellectual laborers can't live on recipro
cal utility alone, regimes of reciprocal production are unlikely to be
completely self-sufficient. University scholars draw a salary, however
modest; researchers at Bell Labs and other industrial campuses get
compensated not just with opportunities to publicize their inventions
but also with cash; open-source programmers, too, tend either to be
employed or, if they are students, to be seeking employment either by
universities or by firms in the computer industry. But because creative
individuals get at least some utility from participating in reciprocal
intellectual production for its own sake, there is less need to rely on
intellectual property rights to spur creativity than the conventional
theory implies. And less is better, since intellectual-property regimes,
like other forms of material incentives - particularly those that confer
monopoly power on producers - generate deadweight losses.79
Consider the benefit that firms in high-tech industries gain from
interactions between their researchers and university scientists. To
promote such contacts, some commentators favor construing patent

76. See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and the
369, 404-05 (2002).

Nature of the Firm,

1 12

YALE L.J.

77. See LERNER & TIROLE, supra note 69, at 15-16.
78. Open-source licensing does not prohibit commercial marketing of products that con
tain open-source code. A Linux package, for example, is successfully distributed by the firm
Red Hat. See MOODY, supra note 72, at 96-98. The existence of commercial distributors,
which combine the product with relatively user-friendly installation programs as well as sup
port services, does not detract from the point that the individuals who are in fact creating the
product that is being so distributed do so without being commercially compensated for their
efforts. Indeed, the tendency of open-source products to generate ancillary commercial
opportunities furnishes commercial firms with incentives to subsidize open-source develop
ment - as, for example, Compaq Computer Corp. and IBM both have for Linux, see id. at
222-36 - thereby reinforcing the economic feasibility of this nonproprietary mode of intel
lectual production.
79. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable
Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 476-77 (2003); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in
Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1 197, 1205-09 (1996).
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law broadly to protect academic works published by these firms'
researchers.8 0 This suggestion, however, ignores how reciprocity influ
ences the economics of commercial intellectual production. Because
the most talented researchers demand the opportunity to disseminate
their work to academics as a form of compensation, competitive pres
sures often drive firms in the pharmaceutical, computer, and telecom
munications industries to permit such exchange even at the expense of
those firms' proprietary control over their researchers' work. Conse
quently, there's no need subsidize this form of idea production with
intellectual-property protections.
Indeed, more property rights than are necessary to support recip
rocal production is likely to be self-defeating, the logic of reciprocity
suggests, insofar as material incentives can impede reciprocal motiva
tions. In a reciprocal system of production, creators naturally produce
and share ideas that other creators are likely to find useful in order to
obtain recognition and respect. In a proprietary system, however,
creators gain a competitive advantage by concealing their ideas from
one another and releasing their work only at a point, and in a form, in
which they can charge a fee for it. This refusal to collaborate can be
expected to generate resentment among reciprocally motivated pro
ducers, who will in turn grow less willing to share their own ideas.
Indeed, when they see others conspicuously cashing in on inventions
enabled by their work, those who

do

publicize their ideas for free are

more likely to feel exploited than honored by their peers. By reversing
the emotional payoff associated with spontaneously adding one's ideas
to the common stock, material incentives effectively crowd out
nonmaterial reciprocal ones.8 1
The negative impact of property rights on reciprocal production is
likely to be self-reinforcing. Some individuals who are only weakly
motivated by reciprocity will find the advent of material reward a
reason to join the system of proprietary production instead. As the
number of individuals engaged in reciprocal production dwindles, the
participatory and reputational benefits associated with collaborative
production will naturally decline too, stifling interest among creators
whose reciprocal inclinations are more moderate in strength. Finally,
as more and more individuals opt out, even the individuals most
strongly devoted to a collaborative system of production will find the
occasions for reciprocating the free exchange of ideas increasingly
scarce - and the occasions for spitefully reciprocating covetous
behavior by proprietary producers increasingly common. The advent
of unnecessary incentives, then, can tip a reciprocal system of produc
tion from a highly cooperative equilibrium into a highly noncoopera-

80. See, e.g.,

GAMBARDELLA, supra note 64, at 48.

81. See Benkler, supra note 76, at 439-41 .
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tive one, in which expansive - and socially costly - property rights

are all the more necessary.8 2

This is, in fact exactly what some commentators believe has hap
pened in the natural sciences. In 1 980, Congress enacted the Bayh
Dole Act, which enlarged the eligibility of universities to obtain pat
ents on so-called "basic research. " Intended to promote collaboration
between university scientists and commercial biotechnology firms, the
Act instead undermined norms of reciprocal collaboration among uni
versity scientists themselves. In response to the Act, a number of
major universities instituted "intellectual property transfer" depart
ments to encourage faculty to conduct their research in a manner con
sistent with their institutions' interest in licensing patents to commer
cial firms. As a result, scientists at other institutions began to find
themselves denied access to many of the most essential materials and
processes in their fields - including gene sequences, cell lines, assays,
and genetically engineered experimental mice - which were either
patented or held close by scientists anxious not to forfeit their com
petitive advantage in patent races. Indeed, for many scientists, the suc
cessful filing of patent applications overtook the publication of articles
as a measure of professional success. Many other scientists resented
the erosion of the traditional university norms of openness and pub
licity.But eventually even they grew wary of casually placing into the
public domain discoveries that nonreciprocating "colleagues" were
likely to appropriate for commercial gain.83
Reciprocal production on the internet is even more vulnerable to
excessive property rights. The internet makes it dirt cheap for recipro
cal producers to access information - the raw material that fuels their
creative efforts - and to disseminate their works among themselves.
The internet's effect on information-access costs, however, is being
reversed by liberal interpretations of existing intellectual-property
rights and by the legislative creation of new ones, which stifle internet
distribution of software codes, databases, and conventional literary
works. Its effect on dissemination costs is being threatened by the
attempted proprietization of standardized protocols for the software
essential to accessing and using the internet.8 4 By raising the cost of

82. See Dasgupta & David, Information Disclosure and the Economics of Science and
Technology, supra note 64, at 535-37; Dasgupta & David, Toward a New Economics of Sci
ence, supra note 66, at 513-15.
83. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Robert P. Merges, Property
Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of Scientific Research, in SCIENTIFIC
INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1996);
Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999).
84. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Or
ganizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of
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obtaining and distributing information, these developments risk pric
ing out many casual open-source programmers.8 5 And as the number
of open-source creators declines, additional ones will find it harder
and less satisfying to participate in this form of reciprocal production
as well.
The logic of reciprocity implies, here as elsewhere, that it makes
more sense to nourish trust than to alter material payoffs. Policymak
ers can do this, in part, by simply clearing the path for established and
emerging systems of collaborative intellectual production. Where, as
in the university and in many information-intensive industries, reci
procity dynamics are already spurring invention, policymakers should
steer clear of the potentially toxic imposition of property rights. By
appropriately narrow interpretations of existing intellectual-property
provisions, policymakers can also head off the demoralizing prospect
of materially motivated actors exploiting the fruit of reciprocal pro
duction for commercial gain.
Ultimately, though, the government will likely need to take a more
active stance in promoting reciprocity. As the examples of the univer
sity, the industrial campus, and open-source programming all illus
trate, collaborative intellectual production depends on ancillary sys
tems of material compensation for reciprocal producers. Private actors
- including philanthropists in the case of universities, and commer
cially motivated firms in the case of industrial campuses - will be
motivated to contribute part of what it costs to operate such systems,
but they are unlikely to contribute the optimal amount. Indeed, gov
ernment subsidization has traditionally played a vital role in securing
the societal benefits of reciprocal production in the university. Similar
efforts of public support - perhaps in the form of tax benefits for
firms that invest in open-source technologies - are likely to be neces
sary to realize the full potential of the internet as a catalyst of recipro
cal production.
Nonproprietary collaborative production has historically played a
major role in the creation of ideas. Guided by the logic of reciprocity,
it has the potential to play an even larger one as in the future.
VI. OTHER APPLICATIONS
The reciprocity theory has implications for a broad range of policy
problems in addition to tax collection, the siting of noxious facilities,

End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era,
REV. 925 (2001).

48

UCLA L.

85. See Yochai Benkler, Intellectual Property and the Organization of Information Pro
duction, 22 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 81 (2002); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Move
ment and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2003, at 33.
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and the production of ideas. It's possible to sketch several in broad
outline.
A.

Fraud and Corruption

Like individuals' disposition to engage in tax evasion, individuals'
disposition to engage in fraud or corruption appears to depend on
whether they think other individuals are engaged in such behavior.s6
This implies that high-profile campaigns to crack down on such
behavior, like high-profile crackdowns on tax evasion, can backfire.s7
Indeed, when government invests more to deter fraud, individuals
have less incentive to invest in credibly signaling to others that they
are trustworthy and honest, and hence reliable as trade partners.
Because individuals reciprocate honesty with honesty, the suppression
of individuals' efforts to display honesty to others will predictably
reduce the disposition of individuals to behave honestly, thus making
penalties for dishonesty less effective. A better policy, again, is to
make citizens aware that those around them are basically honest.
Or at least that is the best policy where individuals are in fact
generally honest. In a condition of pervasive distrust - such as that
which obtains in many former Eastern bloc nations - strong penalties
for fraud and dishonesty may be the only thing that works. Moreover,
in such a climate, penalties for dishonesty may in fact promote rather
than undermine trust. Individuals who resent fraud and corruption are
likely to interpret the advent of credible penalties as evidence that
others around them now feel the same way and are prepared to do
something about it. Some of those individuals will be moved to recip
rocate by behaving more honestly themselves, inducing still others to
do the same, and so forth and so on, until a new condition of self
reinforcing cooperation is reached - at which point maintenance of
high penalties may be less necessary.ss
B.

Democracy

The application of the conventional model of collective action to
democratic politics yields public choice theory. According to that
theory, citizens, because they are self-interested wealth maximizers,
will forgo public-spirited deliberation and instead organize themselves

86. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 268-70
(1989); Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social
Norms and Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390 (1994).
87. ELSTER, supra note 86, at 270.
88. See generally SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN,
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999).
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into interest groups for the purpose of extracting rents.89 To combat
this dynamic, policy analysts have proposed a wide variety of struc
tural devices - from campaign-finance laws9 0 to term limits91 to line
item vetoes9 2 to budget-process reforms93 - all of which seek to raise
the cost or reduce the benefits of organizing into special-interest pres
sure groups.
The reciprocity theory suggests a different analysis. As a positive
matter, it points to a substantial body of empirical research suggesting
that the behavior of elected representatives is limited by informal
norms that discourage unconstrained efforts to redirect public re
sources toward one's own constituencies.94 Thus, reciprocity dynamics
make at least some contribution to containing special-interest politics.
As a prescriptive matter, the reciprocity model warns us not to
assume that structural reforms will invariably reinforce reciprocity
norms in this setting. Policies designed to counteract public choice
pressures do more than change political actors' incentives to engage in
rent-seeking; they also broadcast to citizens and their representatives
that we expect political actors to engage in rent-seeking behavior
whenever it is in their interest to do so. Because individuals are recip
rocators, they are likely to respond to this message by displaying even
less restraint in the pursuit of their material interests in democratic
political life. Thus, reforms aimed at reducing incentives to behave in a
self-interested fashion might well dissipate reciprocity-based norms
that now hold such behavior at least partially in check, and thereby in
crease special-interest rent-seeking on net. The reciprocity model thus
underscores the anxiety that too readily accepting the public choice
picture can make it the reality of our political life.95
At the same time, however, the reciprocity theory underscores
how reforms that reflect different assumptions might stimulate public
spiritedness. For example, scholars have proposed that the state award

89. OLSON, supra note 1, is again the foundational work. See also JAMES M. BUCHANAN
& GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
90. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Ano
nymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998).
91. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen
Legislator, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 623 (1996) (critiquing use of term limits to counteract pub
lic choice dynamics).

92. See Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and
the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (1999).
93. See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal
Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEG. 387 (1998).
94. See generally DONALD P. GREEN & !AN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL
CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994).
95. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997).
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citizens two types of monetary grants: "stakes" that they can use as
they see fit upon adulthood, and "patriot dollars" that they can con
tribute to the political campaigns of their choice.96 The first expresses
society's commitment to assuring individuals a fair chance to realize
their life plans, the second its commitment to assuring them a fair
chance to influence the political process, irrespective of their personal
wealth. It's plausible to believe that many citizens will reciprocate the
goodwill embodied in these schemes by contributing more readily to
the well-being of society and by refraining from purely self-seeking
political behavior. And when they observe public-spirited behavior of
this sort, still more citizens will be moved to behave in the same way.
These proposals, then, are another example of how appropriately
expressive law - even in the form of cash subsidies - can be
expected to heighten reciprocal cooperation.
C.

Street-Level Policing

The conventional theory sees crime prevention as just another
collective-action problem. As a society, we are all better off when we
universally refrain from theft and like forms of predation. But as indi
viduals, each one of us is better off free riding on whatever restraint
our neighbors display while engaging in as much looting and pillaging
as possible. The obvious solution is to create incentives that align indi
vidual interests with collective ones - hence, the threat of severe
criminal punishments for those who break the law.97
Far from curing the pathology of inner-city crime, however, the
reliance on severe penalties has been shown to be one of the patholo
gies. Such penalties convey distrust and animosity on the part of law
enforcement authorities toward inner-city residents. Inner-city resi
dents predictably reciprocate by displaying less willingness to cooper
ate with law-enforcement authorities and less willingness to obey the
law more generally - making it necessary to enact even more severe
penalties, which depress reciprocal cooperation all the more.98
Again, the reciprocity theory suggests the importance of promot
ing trust, here between citizens and the police. At least certain forms
of community policing are geared toward doing exactly that. By giving
citizens a say in how policing is carried out, programs that vest citizens

96. BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTI, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999);
BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS (2002).
97. This is, of course, the economic conception of the "deterrence" theory of criminal
punishment. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
98. See George Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Gang Behavior, Law Enforcement, and
Community Values, in VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 173 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994);
Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 361, 368-69 (2001).
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with significant authority to supervise and participate in law enforce
ment evince respect for citizens, who reciprocate by cooperating more
with the police. Increased cooperation by citizens in turn fosters police
officers' impression that citizens do in fact trust them, a perception
that the police reciprocate by regarding citizens as more trustworthy.
The result is a collaborative style of interaction that ultimately
strengthens a community's crime-fighting capacity.99
D.

Good Samaritanism

Breaking with the traditional Anglo-American position, several
states have recently enacted laws that oblige individuals to assist
strangers in need when they can do so without risk to themselves. Such
laws are intended to counter the supposed growing indifference of
Americans - particularly urban-dwelling ones - toward the well
being of strangers.100
But the reciprocity theory warns that such laws may do more to
construct than to remedy such indifference. Some individuals could
see the apparent necessity of a penalty for nonassistance as confirma
tion that most citizens don't genuinely care about strangers' well
being; those individuals, the reciprocity theory predicts, will respond
by showing less concern themselves. Financial incentives to assist are
also likely to obscure morally motivated acts of assistance, thereby
diluting a signal of good intentions that would otherwise have moved
individuals to reciprocate in kind.
Substantial experimental evidence suggests it simply is not the case
that Americans are disinclined to render assistance to strangers in
need. 1 0 1 The way to strengthen citizens' resolve to render such assis
tance, the reciprocity theory implies, is to correct the misperception
that others lack such resolve, a goal that can be achieved through pub
lic commendations of individuals who engage in heroic behavior.
CONCLUSION
The main - indeed, only - selling point of the conventional
theory of collective action is its asserted behavioral realism. Individu
als, it tells us, are inherently self-seeking. Accordingly, we can't count
on them voluntarily to subordinate their material interests to the good

99.

See generally

WESLEY G.

SKOGAN &

SUSAN M. HARTNEIT, COMMUNITY

POLICING, CHICAGO STYLE ( 1997).
100. See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of
Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1993).
101. See BIBB LATANE & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY
DOESN'T HE HELP? (1970) (reporting experimental results showing that failure to intervene
is attributable to errors in perception especially likely to occur in group settings).
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of society; rather we must alternately bribe and threaten them through
a costly regulatory apparatus, the maintenance of which not only
depletes our common resources but itself creates myriad opportunities
for advantage seeking by self-interested individuals and groups. It is
hard to imagine a less inspiring account of our motives and our pros
pects. But if the ugly picture the conventional theory paints is right,
then we'd be fools to avert our eyes from it.
It turns out, however, that the conventional theory isn't right. Indi
viduals in collective-action settings might not behave like saints, but
they don't behave like fiends either. They can be counted on to
contribute to collective goods, the emerging literature on reciprocity
shows, so long as they perceive that others are inclined to do the same.
Bribes and threats are not nearly so necessary as the conventional
theory would have us believe; the law can instead enlist our coopera
tion by furnishing us with grounds to trust one another to contribute
our fair share to society's needs. Indeed, when the law relies only on
bribes and threats, it breeds the impression that citizens can't trust one
another to contribute to collective goods voluntarily, thereby under
mining their motivation to reciprocate one another's public spirited
ness. Whatever truth there is in the conventional theory is an artifact
of the common acceptance of that theory's bleak assumptions.
So we should now reject them. To replace the conventional theory
of collective action, we should construct a new and more appealing
one founded on our nature as reciprocators. The logic of reciprocity
not only reflects a more realistic understanding of individual emo
tional and moral commitments. It makes the hope that citizens will be
morally and emotionally committed to contribute to the common good
more realistic.

